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Propositions relating to the dissertation A Catalyst for Justice? The International Criminal Court in 
Uganda, Kenya, and the Democratic Republic of Congo by Christian De Vos: 
 
 
1. Complementarity is both a legal rule of admissibility and a policy instrument designed to 
catalyze domestic proceedings. This policy has involved two key strategies for 
complementarity: it signals the Court’s potential to act as a coercive stimulant on 
national jurisdictions and to serve a more cooperative function, wherein the ICC 
supports or literally “complements” national jurisdictions. 
 
2. Article 17 of the Rome Statute has largely been interpreted in a manner that privileges a 
mirroring of the ICC’s normative and institutional frameworks. While this approach is 
consistent with the coercive dimensions of complementarity insofar as it seeks to pull 
states towards compliance with the Rome Statute framework, such strict interpretations 
may well stymie, rather than catalyze, domestic proceedings.  
 
3. Preliminary examinations and investigations are both important stages where 
complementarity’s catalytic properties could be exploited; however, in Uganda, Kenya, 
and the DRC, the ICC Prosecutor’s efforts to catalyze domestic proceedings have been 
hobbled by the lack of a long-term ground presence, insufficient communication with 
key national-level actors, and inadequate appreciation of domestic political contexts.  
 
4. State and non-state actors have summoned the shifting, adaptive nature of 
complementarity to create domestic judicial units specialized in the prosecution of 
international crimes. Depending on the political context, such units have been 
established with the intention of displacing the ICC’s intervention; at other moments, 
they are depicted as institutional extensions of the Court, meant to “complement” and 
complete its work.  
 
5. A desire for uniformity with the Rome Statute’s substantive and procedural provisions 
on the part of powerful external constituencies was largely responsible for driving the 
Statute’s domestic implementation in Kenya, Uganda, and the DRC, but it often glossed 
over deeper political debates about the place of accountability within broader transitional 
justice processes.  
 
6. Interest in the capacity of international courts and prosecutions to serve as “catalysts” at 
the national level has strong affinities with a growing literature on the socializing power 
of international law and legal institutions, and their role in shaping state behavior. 
 
7. ICC interventions and the goals they seek to achieve have not transcended politics; they 
are constituted by politics. The ICC’s “catalytic effect” on state behavior is thus better 
understood as part of a complex political process, rather than a singular desired outcome.  
 
8. Civil society organizations are both object and subject of the ICC’s catalytic effect: they 
seek to expand complementarity’s normative influence, while having themselves been 
transformed by it. 
 
9. A more deferential approach by the ICC to Article 17 challenges could better navigate 
the tensions between the legal test for complementarity and its policy-based elements. 
Because the space that such challenges admit for dialogue between the ICC and national 
jurisdictions is limited, greater attention to the Rome Statute’s cooperation and 
consultation regimes is also warranted. 
 
10. A disproportionate focus on the ICC has overlooked other hybrid arrangements that, by 
their design, could have a deeper relationship to national jurisdictions and a more lasting 
effect on strengthening domestic capacity. Greater investment should be made in these 
arrangements and in a critical orientation that welcomes international criminal justice less 
as a matter of rule following than a project of global legal pluralism.  
 
11. The logic of complementarity shifts depending on the political priorities and goals of 
those who seek to invoke it. 
 
12. Legalism is seductive but perilous.   
 
